COPYRIGHT LAW: EXISTENCE OF A SECOND
LEGITIMATE USE HELD INEFFECTIVE TO CURE
AN INFRINGING PUBLIC PERFORMANCE FOR PROFIT

THE

EXCLUSIVE RIGHT to perform a copyrighted musical composition
publicly for profit 1 has been given an increasingly comprehensive
scope by the federal courts to meet marked changes in technology
and entertainment practices since the enactment of the copyright
law in 1909.2 In Chappell & Co. v. Middletown FarmersMarket &
Auction Co.,3 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that
where the playing of phonograph records aids in creating an attractive shopping atmosphere, such renditions are infringements even
though there exists a second non-infringing purpose of promoting
the sale of records.
The defendant corporation operated a "merchandise mart," or
shopping center, in which it leased space to a music store with an
agreement to publicize in newspapers and by a loudspeaker system
the merchandise sold by its lessee. 4 Without obtaining permission
from any of the five copyright owners or ASCAP,5 the defendant
played over the speaker system phonograph records of musical compositions which were on sale. It contended that these performances
t"EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS AS TO COPYRIGHTED WORKS. Any person entitled thereto, upon
complying with the provisions of this title, shall have the exclusive right ...
(e) To perform the copyrighted work publicly for profit if it be a musical composition...." 17 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
' See generally AMDUR, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE ch. 11 (1936); BALL, THE LAW
OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 422-26 (1944); ROTHENBERG, COPYRIGHT AND
PUBLIC PERFORMANCE OF MusIc 22-27 (1954); ROTHENBERG, LEGAL PROTECnON OF LiT'RATURE, ART AND MUSIC §§ 163-66 (1960); Emerson, Public Performance for Profit: Past
and Present, 3 COPYRIGHT L. SYM. 53 (1940); Finkelstein, Music and the Copyright
Laws, 10 N.Y.L.F. 155 (1964); Wyckoff, Defenses Peculiarto Actions Based on Infringement of Musical Copyrights, 5 COPYRIGHT L. SYM. 256 (1954); Annots. 23 A.L.R.2d 244
(1952), 136 A.L.R. 1438, 1442-43 (1942), 40 A.L.R. 1513 (1926).
534 F.2d 303 (3d Cir. 1964).
The broadcasts originated in the central offices of Middletown and were carried
to some fifty-eight speakers located on the premises and in the parking lot. Id. at 304.
S"The American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers was established to
provide copyright owners collective enforcement of public performance for profit rights.
The organization licenses on a non-exclusive basis the non-dramatic performing rights
of members' works, and may thus bring an action against infringers. ROTHENBERG,
COPYRIGHT AND PUBLIC PERFORMANCE OF MUSic 27, 31 (1954). See generally Harris,
Small Composer Representation and Remedies in ASCAP, 4 PUBLISHING, ENTERTAINMENT, ADVERTISING L.Q. 52 (1964).
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were not infringing because they were to promote record sales8 and
thus benefitted the copyright owners.7 The court, in holding that
these renditions violated the copyrights, stated that a release of the
sole right to manufacture mechanical reproductions" does not constitute a surrender of performance rights, which are relinquished only
by express license, even in connection with the sale of these reproductions. Consequently, although playing the records was not of
direct pecuniary benefit to the defendant, it was "for profit" to the
extent that it was commercially beneficial in creating an attractive
shopping atmosphere."
Although the statutory terms "performance"' 0 and "public"'"
have required extensive definition by the courts, the phrase "for
profit" has presented the greatest problem in construction and application."' In the landmark decision of Herbert v. Shanley Co.,13 the
Supreme Court held that a charge of admission for the privilege of
hearing the performance was not necessary to constitute a performance "for profit.' u 4 Indeed, the profit might derive indirectly
from the sale of food in a dining environment made more attractive
to commercial patroiage by musical entertainment. 5 The courts
0 334 F.2d at 304. There was ccnflicting testimony as tc whether announcements
were made promoting the record sales, but the trial court found only that these compositions were "publicly performed * * * for the entertainment and amusement of
patrons attending such place and to make. such place of business an attractive place
for the patronage of the general public." Id. at 304-05.
7
SeeSFrR, MUSICAL COPYRIGHT 208 (1932).
8334 F.2d at 305. When the owner of a musical copyright has made or authorized a
mechanical recording of the music, the compulsory licensing provision under § 1 (e) of
the Copyright Law allows anyone else to make similar use of the work by paying the
copyright owner a royalty of two cents on each "part manufactured." 17 U.S.C. §
1 (e) (1958). See generally LINDLEY, ENTERTAINMENT, PUBLIsHING AND THE ARTS 727-72
(1963).
9 334 F.2d at 306.
0See, e.g., Jerome H. Remick 9: Co. v. General Elec. Co., 16 F.2d 829 (S.D.N.Y.
1926).
"'See, e.g., M. Witmark & Sons v. Tremont Social & Athletic Club, 188 F. Supp. 787
(D. Mass. 1960); Lerner v. Club Wander In, Inc., 174 F. Supp. 731 (D. Mass. 1959);
Ernest Turner, Elec. Instruments Ltd. v. Peforming Right Soc'y, Ltd., [1943] 1 Ch. 167.
12 See Wyckoff, supra note 2, at 256.
"242 U.S. 591 (1917), 26 YALE L.J. 417.
1 See Buck v. Savoia Restaurant, 27 F. Supp. 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1938); cf. Sarpy v.
Holland. [1908) 2 Ch. 198, 213-14.
" "[I1f the rights under the copyrights are infringed only by a performance where
money is taken at the door they are very imperfectly protected.. . It is true that the
music i, not the sole object, but neithe is the food, which could probably be got
cheapet elsewhere
If music did not pa it would he given up. If it pays it pas
out ol the publics pocket, Whethet it pays or not the purpose of employing it is
profit and that is enough " 242 U.S. at 594-95 (Holmes. J.).
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readily applied the same rule to organ accompaniment in a silent
movie theatre,' performances in a dance hall 7 and other analogous
uses.18

The advent of radio broadcasting demanded amplification of the
Shanley rule.19 An early case 20 involved a department store which
sold radio equipment and played copyrighted musical compositions
over its own radio broadcasting station. Even though all broadcasts
were made without cost to radio listeners21 and the only advertising
was a slogan repeated during the day,22 the court held the performance to be one for profit.28 Shortly thereafter, the Shanley rule
was extended by a holding that an indirect, hidden, future and
uncertain profit was sufficient to constitute an infringement under
the Copyright Act.24 Thus, there was an infringement even where
the radio station was operated by a non-profit corporation established
to promote civic, educational and cultural purposes, and carried
some advertising only to sustain and expand its program. 25
When the courts considered whether the unlicensed use of the
reception of a radio broadcast could be an infringement, the copyright owner again prevailed. Here it was held that control of the
initial radio broadcast did not exhaust the monopolies conferred;
11Irving Berlin, Inc. v. Daigle, 31 F.2d 832, 834 (5th Cir. 1929); Harms v. Cohen,
279 Fed. 276 (E.D. Pa. 1922).
17
Dreamland Ball Room, Inc. v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F.2d 354 (7th Cir.
1929); Buck v. Dacier, 26 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1938).
28Remick Music Corp. v. Interstate Hotel Co., 58 F. Supp. 523 (D. Neb. 1944), aff'd,
157 F.2d 744 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 809 (1946) (eleven cases consolidated
involving a night club, a skating rink, a large dance hall, and dining or refreshment
rooms in hotels.
'9"[T]he
statute may be applied to new situations not anticipated by Congress, if,
fairly construed, such situations come within its intent and meaning." Jerome H.
Remick & Co. v. American Auto Accessories Co., 5 F.2d 411 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
269 U.S. 556 (1925), reversing 298 Fed. 628 (S.D. Ohio 1924). See generally Gitlin,
Radio Infringement of Musical Copyright, I COPYPRGHT L. Syrd. 61 (1939); Simpson,
The Copyright Situation as Affecting Radio Broadcasting, 9 N.Y.U.L. REv. 180 (1931);
Note, 12 B.U.L. Rxv. 243 (1932).
20 M. Witmark & Sons v. L. Bamberger & Co., 291 Fed. 776 (D.N.J. 1923).
21Id. at

777. ,

22At the beginning and end of every periodical program the station broadcast:
"L. Bamberger & Co., One of America's Great Stores, Newark, N.J." Id. at 779.
23 Contra, Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. General Elec. Co., 4 F.2d 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
"Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. American Auto Accessories Co., 5 F.2d 411 (6th Cir.
1925). See Wyckoff, supra note 2, at 263.
"Associated Music Publishers v. Debs Memorial Radio Fund, 141 F.2d 852 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 766 (1944). The court said the defendant "has sought
immediate commercial profit," even in forwarding "its philanthropic program ....
"
Id. at 854. There was an "immediate profit from advertising programs both to the
advertisers and to the corporate defendant." Id. at 855.
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"the public reception for profit itself constitutes an infringement." 26
Likewise, music copyright protection was held applicable to the
transmission of recorded music by private telephone wires to subscribing businesses for the entertainment of their patrons and per27
sonnel.
The court in Middletown had little difficulty finding an infringing use of the musical composition. The cases had established
that a direct profit in the form of a charge for hearing the records
played is not an essential element of infringement. 28 An infringement occurs when there is any profit purpose in the performance
independent of promoting record sales-in the instant case, the entertainment of business customers of the shopping center who might be
induced to shop in surroundings made more pleasant for them by
the music.2 9
The case, however, included an aspect of public performance
for profit not previously raised; here the defendant argued that the
existence of a non-infringing second use obviated the violation presented by entertaining customers. 30 Since the copyright holder is
interested in selling recordings of his musical composition, the right
of a phonograph record dealer to play his stock as an incident of sales
promotion has never been challenged. A leading authority has
asserted that since profit is attributable only to record sales, the
public performance in this situation is not "for profit."3' Yet, the
sole purpose of the performance is to collect the profits from sales
thereby stimulated. In this light, it would appear that a record
dealer's performance should be treated as a reasonable and necessary
20Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 198 (1931). Relaying regular
commercial broadcasts to the rooms, public and private, of the defendant hotel was
held a violation of the copyrights. Ibid. In a later case, relay to the private rooms

only was similarly for profit as a part of the consideration provided guests by the
hotel. Society of European Stage Authors & Composers v. New York Hotel Statler Co.,
19 F. Supp. I (S.D.N.Y. 1937).
'2 Leo Feist, Inc. v. Lew Tendler Tavern, Inc., 162 F. Supp. 129 (E.D. Pa. 1958),
aff'd sub nom. Harms, Inc. v. Sansom House Enterprises, 267 F.2d 494 (3d Cir. 1959),
10 MERCER L. RE.V. 203 (1958).

28

See text accompanying notes 13-25 supra.

20334 F.2d at 305-06.

80Shafter, in his treatise, refers to an unreported case, Buck v. Myers, Equity No. 61,
(W.D. Mo., March 19, 1929), as holding that "a restaurant owner who played records for
two purposes-to entertain his patrons and to sell records-could not claim the latter
protection because the former use was not allowed." SHAFTER, MUSICAL COPYRIGHT 208
(1932). However, this case was neither cited by the court in Middletown, nor relied
upon by the parties in their briefs, nor mentioned in any other work on the subject
which has been examined.
a'SHAFTER, op. cit. supra note 30, at 208.
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exception to the music copyright protection. Perhaps the defense of
"fair use," originally developed by the courts for literary works, 82
could properly excuse such use of a musical composition.
Regardless of the theoretical justification for excluding performances to promote records sales from copyright violation, according to the Middletown decision the existence of a legitimate use does
not justify an infringing dual use.83 When an infringing purpose is
established, the fact that the performance is also used for a noninfringing purpose is not a defense and would appear immaterial.
Dicta in an earlier case of somewhat analogous circumstances
might have suggested the result in this case. Where the proprietor
of a business merely played for his own enjoyment a radio which
might be deemed partially for the benefit of customers who also
happen to listen, such was held to be "public" and "for profit," but
not "performance."' 4 However, that decision relied on a prior case"8
which was later reversed as to the concept of performance. This
would seem to indicate that such acts would not be held public performances for profit. While the businessman's private enjoyment of
the broadcast, the primary purpose, would not be infringing, listening by customers renders the performance both public and for
386
profit.
82See Broadway Music Corp. v. F-R Publishing Corp., 31 F. Supp. 817 (S.D.N.Y.
1940); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. P.F. Collier & Son, 26 U.S.P.Q. 40 (SJ).N.Y. 1934).
"Fair use may be defined as a privilege in others than the owner of a copyright to
use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without his consent, notwithstanding the monopoly granted to the owner by the copyright. Fair use is technically
an infringement of copyright, but is allowed by law on the ground that the appropriation is reasonable and customary." BALL, COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 260

(944).

1

,

In determining whether a fair use exists, "the court must look to the nature and
object of the selections made, the quantity and value of the materials used, and the
degree in which this may prejudice the sale, diminish the profits, or supersede the
objects of the original work." M. Witmark & Sons v. Pastime Amusement Co., 298
Fed. 470, 477 (E.DS.C. 1924). See generally AMDUR, CoPYRIGHT LAw AND PRACncE
754-83 (1936); Cohen, Fair Use in the Law of Copyright, 6 COPYRIGHT L. SYM. 43 (1955).
8 In M. Witmark & Sons v. L. Bamberger & Co., 291 Fed. 776 (D.N.J. 1923), the
court rejected the defendant's argument that the plaintiff could not complain of the
broadcasting of his song because of the great advertising service thereby rendered. It
recognized the valuable enhancement of sales, but stated that even here the choice
of the method of advertising belongs to the owner, who has "the exclusive right to
publish and vend, as well as to perform." Id. at 780.
3,Buck v. Debaum, 40 F.2d 784 (S.D. Cal. 1929).
3r Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 82 F.2d 366 (W.D. Mo. 1929), rev'd, 283 U.S.
191 (1981).
18The argument that a primary purpose of private enjoyment should render the
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A more difficult situation suggested by narrowing the facts in
Middletown is the typical department store where records are played
only at the counter where sold, but are clearly audible in surrounding departments. This situation is perhaps distinguishable from

Middletown in that the same person is directly responsible for both
the infringing use and the legitimate use.37 However, if Middletown
applies, the proprietor would be required to close off the sound by

listening booths to avoid a copyright violation.38
To some extent this decision raised a dilemma of conflicting

interests. While the copyright holder wants his records to be sold as

30
widely as possible to recover the royalties under the Copyright Act,

the case declares illegitimate a practice which would frequently
accord him more benefits from increased record sales than he could
receive as damages for infringement. 40 Thus, in some instances the

copyright holder may wish to encourage the public performance of
records by making licenses freely available to shopping centers.
The necessity of raising the question involved in this case could
have been obviated by a statute which more clearly delineates
copyright protection. Change in the law is urgently needed to

eliminate obscurity of rights and to conform to modern demands
and practices. 41 A complete revision of the copyright law has been
use allowable when only an occasional member of the public overhears was not discussed in Buck v. Debaum, 40 F.2d 734 (S.D. Cal. 1929).
1 In Middletown the defendant merchandise mart relied upon a non-infringing
use properly attributable to sales by its lessee record shop. Future cases could draw a
tenuous distinction between Middletown and a defendant who personally sells the
records in conjunction with an infringing dual use. In such a case, a defendant could
at least claim a direct connection with the legitimate use. See also Wyckoff, supra
note 2, at 263-64.
38 Query whether the music played by the typical department store record counter
actually creates a pleasant shopping atmosphere.
39 See note 8 supra.
'0 Minimum statutory damages are $250, or $10 for each infringing performance
when more than twenty-five. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (b) (1958).
It is very difficult to establish actual damages beyond the minimum. For a discussion of the inadequacy of the
remedy, see Note, 49 YALE L.J. 559 (1940).
" Although public performance rights in music were the subject of greater diligence and attention than any other portion of the law from its inception, H.R. REP.
No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1909), statutory revision has long been vehemently
urged. There has been much criticism concerning unclear rights, inexplicit defenses,
inadequate remedies, and unnecessary exceptions. See Celler, Copyright-New Frontiers,
10 COPYRIGHT Soc'Y BULL. 84 (1962); Joines, Analysis, Criticism, Comparison and Suggested Corrections of the Copyright Law of the United States Relative to Mechanical
Reproductions of Music, 2 COPIRIcHT I. Sv-s. 43 (194'0)- rannenbaum. The U.S.
Copyright Statute--An Analysis of Its Major Aspects an-1 Shortcomings, 10 N.Y.L.F. 12
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Congress. 42

introduced at the present session of
Among the signifi4s
cant changes proposed are elimination of the "for profit" limitation 4- and specification of the circumstances when performances
are exempt.45 The enactment of these provisions would appear to
be desirable,4 6 but it would also seem wise to include among the
exempt performances the record dealer's renditions exclusively for
the purpose of sales promotion. This needed clarification, however,
would not disturb the result in Middletown, where the performance
would clearly be an infringing use unaffected by an accompanying
use of an exempt nature.
The Middletown decision applies established rules for determining an infringing use for profit and follows the trend of
judicial interpretations which have, almost without exception, protected the music copyrights. 47 The court prohibited exploitation of
(1964). The exemption of jukeboxes under 17 U.S.C. § 1 (e) (1958) has been especially
criticized. Finkelstein, Music and the Copyright Laws, 2 N.H.B.J. 136, 142 (1960);
Mooney, The Jukebox Exemption, 10 COPYRIGHT L. SYM. 194 (1959).
12S. 1006, H.R. 4347, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). For a good discussion by the
Register of Copyrights of the bill as introduced in substantially the same form at the
end of the previous session, S. 3008, H.R. 11947, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., (1964), see
Kaminstein, The McClelan-Celler Bill for General Revision of the United States
Copyright Law, 10 N.Y.L.F. 147 (1964).
IsIncluded in the bill are: specific definitions of "perform" (§ 106(b)(1)) and
"publicly" (§ 106 (b) (3)); a change in the compulsory licensing for recordings (§ 113)
with higher royalties (§ 113 (c) (2)); recognition of the fair use doctrine without
limiting or defining the extent of its application (§ 107); longer duration of copyright
terms (§§ 302-05); and elimination of the jukebox exception (§ 114).
""ExcLusvF RIGHTS IN COPYRIGHTED WORKS (a)... the owner of copyright under
this title has the exclusive rights... (4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and
choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures, to perform the copyrighted
work publicly...." (Emphasis added.) S. 1006, H.R. 4347, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., §
106 (1965). Although ASCAP and its members want the "for profit" limitation elimi.
nated, the Register of Copyrights had formerly recommended its continuance. Pasarow,
Viewpoint of the Phonograph Record and Music Industries, 11 COPYRIGHT So'Y BULL.
25, 32 (1963). See also Celler, supra note 41.
" The bill in § 109 excludes performances: in the course of face-to-face teaching
activities; for reception solely within nonprofit educational institutions; in the course
of services at a religious assembly; and without purpose of commercial advantage or
payment to performers when there is no admission charge, or when the net proceeds
are used for educational, religious, or charitable purposes and not for private profit.
Also exempt are retransmissions of unaltered content without purpose of commercial
advantage or charge to recipients, and such retransmissions to hotel rooms without
separate charge to occupants; public reception of transmissions on receiving sets as
used in homes unless a direct charge is made or it is further transmitted to the public;
and single ephemeral recordings for use by broadcasters. S. 1006, H.R. 4347, 89th
Cong., Ist Sess., § 109 (1965).
," "Copyright law revision in the United States is long overdue, and the failure of
the current program would be a real, if not major, national tragedy." Kaminsteln,
supra note 42, at 154.
'7 See Wyckoff, supra note 2, at 263.
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copyrighted works for the maintenance of a pleasant shopping atmosphere when only a bare excuse of promoting sales exists. A contrary result would have left too unclear just when sales of records
48
would justify public performances for profit.
18 This casenote has been entered in the Nathan Burkan memorial competition.

